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China: A New Force in the
Global Marketplace
by Murray Weidenbaum

This is a time of fundamental change in the global marketplace. It's like the
middle of the 19th century when European nations dominated the world economy - and
then the United States elbowed its way into the club of industrialized nations.
Again, in the middle of the 20th century, when Western nations dominated the
world economy, Japan elbowed its way into the club. In both cases, the world economy
continued to grow, if not to accelerate, although the monopoly of the "club" was broken.
In absolute terms, each nation experienced growth in its production and exports, although
their relative shares of the world market declined.
Today, China stands at the threshold of a similar breakthrough. By some widely
used measures, it already is a larger economy than Germany. China, in effect, is in a race
with Japan for second place- just behind the United States. A word about the changes
in China is in order. There has been no dramatic equivalent of the Berlin wall coming
down. But, since 1979, China has been moving toward capitalism and economic
expansion - only a step at a time and only partially.

The Transition from Communism
Deng Xiaoping was the driving force. He made that decision on practical rather
than philosophical grounds. The economic superiority of capitalism became obvious.
While China had difficulty feeding itseit: Taiwan and Hong Kong - both with the same
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kind of people as the mainland - were booming. He substituted economic incentive and
technology for Mao's ideology, unity for class struggle, and experts for "red" loyalists.
It is fascinating to recall that private agriculture- rather than private industry-

was the entering wedge. After selling the required amount to the government, a farmer
could sell the rest in the market. That's the incentive of capitalism - produce more and
earn more. And it worked! To save face, they called it "market socialism."
The results were impressive. By 1990, pork consumption doubled. The number
of fresh eggs eaten tripled. Luxury fruits and vegetables became commonplace.
The reform of industry followed agriculture, but more slowly. Special Economic
Zones were set up to promote exports. Coincidentally, all four were near Hong Kong or
Taiwan. Tax breaks and other capitalistic incentives lured foreign business. Deng
eliminated the three socialist "irons" that had inhibited economic growth in China: The
"iron rice bowl" that had guaranteed jobs; "iron chains" that had guaranteed
management tenure; and the "iron wages" which had guaranteed that pay never would be
cut.
Most of those foreign businesses were not from the obvious places- Japan,
United States, or Western Europe. Rather, they were overseas Chinese who were
investing in their traditional homeland. I'll have more to say about that bamboo network
in a moment. The special economic zones were a smashing success. Foreign investment
in the zones expanded very rapidly and now accounts for large shares of China's exports.
Guangdong province, adjacent to Hong Kong, became the wealthiest part of China.
Guangdong is almost an extension of Hong Kong and the recent exit of the British is
unlikely to change this relationship. Xiamen near Taiwan has also boomed, although not
to the same extent as Hong Kong.
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Other parts of China want to copy the success in the Southeast. They haven't yet
done as well. Some of the more urban areas are tied down by socialist approaches to
production. The rural areas lack transport and other infrastructure. Nevertheless,
substantial amounts of new industry are expanding into the interior, especially along the
Yangtze.
Even before the Hong Kong takeover, Beijing began to hedge its bets. The
national government is promoting the economic rebirth of Shanghai, which before World
War II was China's commercial capital. Foreign business in Shanghai now has more
leeway than in Guangdong. They can sell to the local population, while most foreign
ventures in China are limited primarily to exporting or to providing items not available
from domestic producers.
Economic progress in China is uneven. In some areas, Coca-Cola is available but it is delivered by mule. China has no personal checks and few credit cards, no 800
numbers, and no overnight shipments. If you've been to a major Chinese city recently,
you will recognize that it is a bicycle society moving up to motor scooters.

Business Opportunities for Americans
To state the obvious, business opportunities in China for Americans are
numerous. Nevertheless, cynics abound among Western business executives living in
China. They love to quote an imaginary P. T. Wang: "There's a foreigner born every
minute." They will also tell you of aT-shirt on sale in Beijing: "If you're too honest,
you'll always lose out."
But signs of U.S. companies are frequent: Marlboro Man billboards, KFC
restaurants, Motorola cellular phones, Elizabeth Arden cosmetics, and Nike sneakers.
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McDonald's in Guangdong set a world record- 14,000 customers in one day. When the
local 7-11 opened, riot police were called in to control crowds.
Guangdong is Procter & Gamble's largest overseas market for shampoo. CocaCola dominates the soft drink market with bottlers at 16 locations - seven more are on
the way. Hainan Coconut Juice is just not a very strong competitor. Other U.S. firms
that have invested at least $100 million in China include ARCO, Amoco, United
Technologies, Pepsico, Lucent Technologies, General Electric, General Motors, HewlettPackard, and IBM.
To be sure, there is often a need to adapt foreign products to China's culture.
Hasbro sells its GI Joe doll as an "international hero." It changed the colors to the
People's Liberation Army's camouflage green and the Communist Party red. Maxwell
House sells instant coffee - complete with premixed packets of cream and sugar for a
market not very familiar with the product.
Those of us who take the freedoms of our private enterprise economy for granted
should not forget that government is still pulling many of the strings in China's economy.
Companies that try to compete against domestic firms for the Chinese market may not
find the path as easy as those that generate the high-tech products and exports that
Chinese leaders are so eager to see expand.
The Chinese are the original Yankee traders. They know the great business
potential that will be generated as a country with 1.2 billion people industrializes, and
they are trying their best to take advantage of it. They love foreign investment when it
creates new jobs, pays taxes, and generates foreign exchange. But, from our point of
view, sometimes those exports compete against the products of the same company's
factories located in other countries.

5

Thus, Motorola is encouraged to sell cellular telephones and to produce them in
China. McDonnell Douglas and Boeing sell jet airplanes in China but they involve local
subcontractors and train local maintenance people. These companies are also showing
more sophistication than some of the early entrants, such as Schwinn. That U.S. bicycle
manufacturer lost its business in China by transferring its technology to local
manufacturers without adequate protections.
Typically, a U.S. company faces the challenge of developing a presence in the
China market in a manner which is very different from our experience at home or even in
Western Europe. In China, there are few 100 percent American-owned companies but
mostly joint ventures and often with Chinese middlemen either from the mainland or
elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Guanxi, or personal connections, can help in dealing with the many layers of
bureaucracy in China and the "bamboo network" of ethnic Chinese business families in
Southeast Asia can be a big help in serving as a transition. Their emphasis on personal
relations can clash, however, with the U.S. practice of using lawyers as intermediaries.
The head of the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group, the Bangkok-based former joint-venture
partner ofWal-Mart in Hong Kong and China, laments that U.S. lawyers can destroy the
chemistry needed between partners to make a deal work. We have to wonder whether
that's why that prominent constituent of the bamboo network is aformer joint partner of
Wal-Mart- or whether the U.S. firm just did not want to cut too many comers. In any
event, Wal-Mart is reportedly off to a good, albeit belated, start in China with both a
Supercenter and a Sam's Club in Shenzhen.
Another difficulty that Americans encounter in China and the Orient generally is
the Asian model for promoting human rights. In that part of the world, economic
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freedom comes before political liberty. To put it in perspective though, here's an
important quote, "I firmly believe that business is the ultimate force for democratic
change in China."
Who said that? An NAM official? An export promoter? No. Li Lu, an exiled
Tiananmen Square student leader who has been studying in the United States.
Many U.S. firms enter China via joint ventures with a Chinese company that is
part of what I have called the bamboo network. The tales of the work ethic of the
overseas Chinese are legendary. The leading Hong Kong billionaire started work at the
age of 12 to support his family. The grandfather of a former student of mine generated
the original nest egg to finance the family multinational enterprises by ironing shirts in
the back room of a Chinese hand laundry. He used his savings to buy a $50,000 rice
concession in Hong Kong, which is the basis of the family fortune. Think of hundreds or thousands - of Horatio Algers repeating these experiences.
A good example is the CP Group of Thailand. It started as a very small seed
company in China and then moved to Bangkok. CP is now the largest agri-business
investor in China and perhaps the largest "foreign" investor in China. It was a partner to
KFC, 7-11, and Heineken, to get them started in the region.
The bamboo network firms are family-oriented. They shy from publicity and take
a low profile in the commercial world. They do not produce and distribute consumer
products with their own brand names. Instead, they make components, manufacture for
others, do sub-assembly work.
These overseas Chinese business firms rely on centralized family control and
informal transactions. That minimizes bureaucracy and paperwork. Key information is
obtained in conversation and retained in the heads of senior managers. That certainly
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eliminates the need for a lot of formal reporting. Just compare that with the massive flow
of studies, reports, and memos in a typical U.S. business.
In the ethnic Chinese firm, transactions are often dealt with by a note jotted in a
diary. Money is borrowed from family and friends on trust. Clearly, management styles
are far more informal and intuitive than Americans are accustomed to. The Chinese
approach to business allows opportunities to be seized as they arise with little need for
elaborate consultant reports. Due diligence is not an expensive, legal-oriented process.
On the other hand, this management model works better in low-tech than in high-tech
businesses, in industrial markets rather than in consumer markets, in areas with
rudimentary legal systems rather than in countries with sophisticated jurisprudence.
The information network of the overseas Chinese business family leaders is
unrivaled. They know each other personally, often coming from a common birthplace.
They cooperate across borders. For example, the key ethnic Chinese banking family of
Thailand - they control the Bank of Bangkok - provided the initial financing for what
is now the largest Chinese business family in Indonesia. That family, in turn, provided
the beginning funding for a major Chinese business family in Malaysia.
The typical bamboo network firm operates through an intricate network of
enterprises rather than a unitary family company. There is no equivalent of a Ford or
Walton family focusing on one very large firm. Rather, the typical family groups own
percentage interests in a galaxy of medium-sized firms. Family members are inserted
into key management positions. Cross-holdings are common with other familycontrolled firms. This provides both secrecy and diversification in a region where
discrimination and threat of expropriation are pervasive. A common saying is, "Keep
your bags packed at all times."
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A word of warning is always in order. Doing business in China can be very
difficult. Don't expect to fmd a consistent, easily understood, universally enforced
judicial system. There are only rudimentary and limited legal protections that foreign
ventures can draw on. This can dampen the enthusiasm for making large investments in
what is fundamentally a very attractive market. Consider the irony: in the United States,
we are concerned about the excessive degree of litigation. Perhaps, we should reduce our
trade deficit with China by exporting to them some of our surplus lawyers.
Economists are notoriously wet blankets. So, true to form, let me report that
business in China is not always profitable. Foreign companies doing business there
usually talk about current sales successes and future profit performance. To some extent,
that is to be expected with new investments, but perhaps not as universally as seems to be
the case in China. Take Volkswagen's five-year-old joint venture with China's First
Auto Works. VW has not yet reported a profit. But sales are high - up 6 percent in
1996. That is better than Peugeot's experience - a $100 million loss.
Even fellow ethnic Chinese have difficulty breaking even. Less than 40 percent
of Taiwanese investments in China are now profitable. Also, Chinese labor may not
always be as productive as we expect, although the unit cost is low. They may require
more managers than other developing countries. Often companies doing business in
China have to import overseas ethnic Chinese managers.
Even experienced Asian investors can get burned. Recall the Hong Kongers who
opened a restaurant for tourists near Tiananmen Square just a week before the shooting.
No amount of due diligence would have prevented that fiasco.
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China's Role in History

It is helpful to have some historical perspective about China's role in the world.
In the broad sweep of world history, China has not been a backward nation. For most of
recorded history, China was No. 1 - more developed than the West, more prosperous,
more sophisticated, and more civilized. That is why they called themselves the "Middle
Kingdom." Only in the past 500 years has the West been ahead. Of course, that's a long
time for us. But the Zhou Dynasty in the first millennium BC lasted that long. Naturally,
most of us never heard about it.
China is now on a road that could restore its earlier greatness. By some economic
m~asures,

China is just behind Japan. If current trends continue, it could become No.2

early in the 21st century, just behind the United States in terms of economic output.
Some optimists (or rather pessimists) think it will be No. I later in the 21st century. But
here we can take considerable satisfaction with a standard caveat: trends rarely n1ove in a
straight line, especially in China. There is no shortage of serious problems facing the
Chinese people and their leadership - energy shortages, environmental degradation,
infrastructure, inadequacies, and corruption and crime. Then again, there is the famous
forecast which is attributed to Napoleon: "China is a sleeping giant. When it wakes, it
will shake the world."
It is vital for Americans to better understand events in that exotic part of the world

and not be on the outside trying to look in. China is the prime example of my standard
forecast: In change, there is both threat and opportunity. My final point: infeng shui
(Chinese numerology), eight is a lucky number. Thus, I leave you with my favorite eight
letters: Good luck!

